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FOR NEARLY TWO DECADES, the U.S. SupremeCourt has insisted that partisan gerryman-
dering—the drawing of election district bound-
aries with the deliberate purpose of helping or
harming the fortunes of a particular political
party—can in some circumstances violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. At the same time, the Court has failed to
provide lower courts, legislatures, political par-
ties and litigants with a coherent standard by
which to evaluate the constitutionality of leg-
islative redistricting plans. As a result, through
two federal census cycles that have produced
more than one hundred state legislative and
U.S. congressional redistricting plans and thou-
sands of county and municipal plans, no fed-
eral court has ever invalidated a legislative ap-
portionment plan on the ground that it violated
constitutional limits on partisan gerrymander-
ing.
In this environment, the Court’s decision this
Term in Vieth v. Jubelirer,1 its first partisan ger-
rymandering case since 1986, was eagerly an-
ticipated by state legislatures, political opera-
tives, and redistricting consultants around the
nation. The result was disappointing: a badly
divided Court was unable to reach agreement
on any new standard. To make matters worse,
Justice Kennedy, who cast the swing vote,
agreed with four justices that partisan gerry-
mandering may in principle violate the Con-
stitution; agreed with four different justices
that the prevailing Bandemer standard was un-
workable; and then left the law a shambles by
declining even to speculate about how a judi-
cially manageable standard might be framed to
capture the distinction between permissible
and forbidden reapportionment plans. Vieth
thus appears to resolve nothing, while inviting
litigants to continue bringing what have
proven uniformly to be fruitless actions in the
hope of stumbling blindly upon some legal
standard that might supply the as-yet un-
known incantation necessary to evoke judicial
relief.
Despite the seeming hopelessness of the sit-
uation, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Vieth does,
I believe, suggest a potentially fruitful strategy
by which opponents of partisan gerrymander-
ing may return to the Court in the not-too-dis-
tant future in a position of much greater
strength. This strategy, however, requires elec-
tion reform litigators to do something that they
have long been extremely reluctant to do: try
their luck in state courts, under provisions of
state constitutions. The abandonment of fed-
eral court would not be permanent. I shall ar-
gue that Justice Kennedy’s appeal in Vieth for
a judicially manageable standard by which to
evaluate partisan gerrymandering stands as an
invitation to litigants to work at the state con-
stitutional level to develop a nationwide con-
sensus about how such claims should be han-
dled. Once such a standard emerges from the
pack—a process which need not take a great
deal of time—litigants may then return to fed-
eral court well poised to argue for federal adop-
tion of the consensus state-level standard. The
Supreme Court has adopted state-level con-
James A. Gardner is Professor of Law, State University of
New York, University at Buffalo Law School. 1124 S.Ct. 1769 (2004).
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sensus standards as federal constitutional law
in other contexts, including criminal procedure
and due process, and there is no particular rea-
son why the same strategy could not work for
partisan gerrymandering claims.
In the balance of this article, I describe federal
partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence from
Bandemer to Vieth; explain the processes by which
principles of state constitutional law can and fre-
quently have influenced the content of federal
constitutional law; and explore some of the av-
enues by which partisan gerrymandering claims
might be advanced under state constitutions.
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS
IN FEDERAL COURT
The Court’s first ruling dealing directly with
partisan gerrymandering was its 1986 decision
in Davis v. Bandemer,2 in which Indiana Demo-
crats challenged a state legislative redistrict-
ing plan drawn by Republicans following the
1980 census. The Republican plan was used in
the 1982 election cycle, resulting, Democrats
claimed, in an unfair windfall of Republican
seats statewide. The Court rejected the claim in
a splintered opinion. Although six justices
agreed that a partisan gerrymander violates the
Equal Protection Clause if it involves “both in-
tentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory ef-
fect on that group,”3 they split decisively over
how to operationalize this standard. A four-jus-
tice plurality held that partisan gerrymander-
ing could be proven only by a showing of “con-
tinued frustration of the will of a majority of
the voters or effective denial to a minority of
voters of a fair chance to influence the political
process.”4 Because “continued” frustration
could not be demonstrated by the results of a
single election cycle, the plurality rejected the
constitutional claim.5 Two other justices, in
contrast, believed that the evidence was suffi-
cient to show an impermissible exclusion of
Democrats from the redistricting process, and
a consequent loss of political influence that was
constitutionally sufficient to make out a parti-
san gerrymandering claim.6 Three other jus-
tices dissented on the ground that partisan ger-
rymandering raises a nonjusticiable political
question.7
For eighteen years, lower federal courts
struggled unsuccessfully to make sense of Ban-
demer. Denied a majority holding on the pre-
vailing standard, lower courts tended to rely
on the plurality’s standard.8 This standard,
however, proved so demanding that in nearly
two decades of partisan gerrymandering liti-
gation not a single plaintiff ever prevailed on
such a claim. Dozens of redistricting plans were
invalidated for violating the Equal Protection
Clause on other grounds—most notably viola-
tion of the one-person, one-vote standard—and
many plans were invalidated under the federal
Voting Rights Act, but not a single plan was
ever struck down for exceeding the bounds of
permissible partisanship in drawing district
lines.
In April 2004, the Court decided its second
partisan gerrymandering case, Vieth v. Jubelirer,
in which Pennsylvania Democrats challenged
a congressional reapportionment plan drawn,
following the 2000 census, by a Republican-
controlled legislature and signed by a Repub-
lican governor. Delivering another badly splin-
tered opinion, the Court in Vieth did nothing
to clear up the confusion, and indeed worsened
it. A minority consisting of Justice Scalia, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor and Justice
Thomas ruled that all partisan gerrymandering
claims should be dismissed as nonjusticiable
for lack of a judicially manageable standard. A
different minority, consisting of Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, argued
in four separate opinions that partisan gerry-
mandering claims are justiciable, and each ad-
vanced a standard for evaluating such claims.
None of these standards commanded more
than two votes.
In a notably wishy-washy opinion, Justice
Kennedy provided the critical swing vote by
splitting the difference between the two blocs.
While acknowledging “weighty arguments for
holding cases like these to be nonjusticiable,”
GARDNER644
2478 U.S. 109 (1986).
3Id. at 127 (plurality opinion of Justice White), 161 (con-
curring opinion of Justice Powell).
4Id. at 133 (White, J.).
5Id. at 134–37.
6Id. at 173–78 (Powell, J.).
7Id. at 144–45 (O’Connor, J.).
8Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S.Ct. at 1777 (Scalia, J.)
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Justice Kennedy maintained nevertheless that
such arguments “are not so compelling that
they require us now to bar all future claims of
injury from a partisan gerrymander.”9 Al-
though willing to hold open the door to future
partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice
Kennedy was unwilling either to endorse any
of the standards proposed by other justices or
to propose any standard of his own; instead, he
lamented the fact that “there are yet no agreed
upon substantive principles of fairness in dis-
tricting,” and that as a result, “we have no ba-
sis on which to define clear, manageable, and
politically neutral standards for measuring the
particular burden a given partisan classifica-
tion imposes on representational rights.”10
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy did not find this
uncertainty particularly troubling: “That no
such standard has emerged in this case should
not be taken to prove that none will emerge in
the future.”11 Consequently, he argued, the
Court should not prematurely bar all partisan
gerrymandering claims, but should be pre-
pared to hear them “[i]f workable standards do
emerge for measuring the burden a gerryman-
der imposes on representational rights.”12
But how and from where might such stan-
dards emerge? Normally, the Supreme Court
expects precise standards for constitutional in-
juries to emerge from the give and take of liti-
gation in the lower federal courts. However, as
Justice Scalia pointed out in Vieth, “[e]ighteen
years of judicial effort” in the lower federal
courts under the Bandemer standard has “vir-
tually nothing to show for it.”13 Nor, according
to Justice Kennedy, can “helpful discussions on
the principles of fair districting” be found “in
the annals of parliamentary or legislative bod-
ies.”14 There is, however, a potentially promis-
ing yet largely untried venue in which to de-
velop the kind of standard Justice Kennedy





Every state has its own constitution, and each
state constitution provides at least some, and
in most cases, extensive protection for individ-
ual rights.15 For the most part, state constitu-
tional rights provisions tend to resemble coun-
terpart provisions in the U.S. Constitution, and
consequently tend to protect more or less the
same rights that appear in the federal docu-
ment. Moreover, state courts often look to the
U.S. Supreme Court for guidance in interpret-
ing parallel provisions of their own constitu-
tions, and consequently the dominant pattern
among state bills of rights is one of similar pro-
visions, similarly interpreted.16
There are, however, important exceptions to
the general pattern. First, state constitutions
frequently contain provisions that have no
counterpart in the U.S. Constitution. Such pro-
visions sometimes include the right to an ade-
quate education, the right to a judicial remedy
for injuries and other wrongs, and, perhaps sig-
nificantly, the rights to vote and to free and fair
elections. Second, even when state constitu-
tional rights provisions bear a textual similar-
ity to provisions of the U.S. Constitution, state
courts are free to interpret them differently,
and have often done so.
State constitutions are independent bodies of
law, and their meaning therefore does not de-
pend upon the meaning of other provisions ap-
pearing in other constitutions, no matter how
similar the text.17 State courts consequently
may interpret such provisions in whatever way
they think best, and have on many occasions
exercised their independent judgment to read
provisions of state constitutions differently
from, and often more generously than, the U.S.
Supreme Court has read similar provisions of
the federal Constitution, a phenomenon often
known as the “New Judicial Federalism.”18 For
example, courts in five states have held, con-
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13Id. at 1778 (Scalia, J.).
14Id. at 1794 (Kennedy, J.).
15G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 11–13.
16Id. at 39–55.
17William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977);
Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’
Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980).
18Tarr, supra note 15, at 161–70.
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trary to the U.S. Supreme Court, that the free
speech provisions of their state constitutions
protect a right to speak in privately owned
shopping malls.19 Numerous state courts have
rejected, under state constitutional provisions
barring unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Supreme Court’s ruling that a canine sniff
does not amount to a constitutionally cogniz-
able “search.”20 The highest courts of Califor-
nia and New York have interpreted their state
constitutions to prohibit warrantless aerial
searches, rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the Fourth Amendment.21
These kinds of independent-minded state
constitutional rulings require state officials to
adhere to different, and in many cases more de-
manding, constraints in the performance of
their constitutional duties, and are for that rea-
son alone potentially significant avenues by
which to address problems raised by partisan
gerrymandering. But state court rulings under
state constitutions also have another kind of
impact that makes them doubly useful: they
can, in the long run, influence the content of
federal constitutional law, thereby altering the
constitutional rules governing the behavior of
federal officials and, by operation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, of state officials in states
other than those in which the rulings originate.
State constitutional rulings can influence the
content of federal constitutional law in at least
two ways, one weak and one strong. The
weaker of the two forms of influence consists
simply of persuasion. Over the past twenty or
thirty years, legal scholars have come increas-
ingly to accept a “dialogic” model of legal
meaning.22 According to this model, federal
courts do not sit in splendid, ivory-tower iso-
lation, interpreting the Constitution through
the independent identification and elaboration
of constitutional first principles. Rather, con-
stitutional meaning is understood to emerge
from a conversation, sometimes collaborative
and sometimes adversarial, among numerous
interpreters, including Congress, the executive
branch, lower federal courts, and state judicia-
ries. In this system, the U.S. Supreme Court
may occupy a privileged position as the final
arbiter of constitutional meaning, but it enjoys
no special privilege in the generation of con-
stitutional meaning.
State courts engage in this dialogue con-
cerning the meaning of federal constitutional
law most directly, of course, when they inter-
pret provisions of the federal Constitution, but
they also do so when they interpret provisions
of their own state constitutions. Perhaps the
most visible engagement of this type occurs
when a state court gives a provision of the state
constitution an interpretation different from
the one the U.S. Supreme Court has given a tex-
tually similar provision of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. In declining to follow the Supreme Court,
a state supreme court may register a forceful
public dissent, arguing in essence that the
Supreme Court has failed to capture correctly
the meaning of a jointly protected constitu-
tional right.23 Ultimately, this kind of interju-
dicial dialogue may help persuade the Court
that it has erred.
State constitutional rulings may also influ-
ence the content of federal constitutional law
in a stronger way: by contributing to the es-
tablishment of a nationwide legal consensus at
the state level. Such a consensus can be signif-
icant for federal constitutional law because fed-
GARDNER646
19Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), with
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal.
1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Bock v. Westminster Mall
Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Batchelder v. Allied Stores
International, 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983); New Jersey
Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty
Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); Alderwood Assocs. v.
Washington Environmental Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash.
1981).
20Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
with, e.g., McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506 (Alaska App.
1991); People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1986); State v.
Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn, 564
N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530
A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987).
21Compare California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), with
People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299 (Cal. 1985); People v. Scott,
593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).
22In the context of federalism specifically, see Robert M.
Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federal-
ism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L. J. 1035
(1977); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87
Cal. L. Rev. 1409 (1999); Lawrence Friedman, The Con-
stitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Fed-
eralism, 28 Hastings Const. L. Q. 93 (2000).
23James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resis-
tance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of
State Constitutions, 91 Geo. L. J. 1003, 1033–37 (2003).
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eral courts sometimes look to statewide agree-
ment as evidence of national trends, beliefs,
and traditions. These beliefs and traditions may
then in turn be incorporated into federal con-
stitutional law as baselines for federal consti-
tutional decision making, most notably in ad-
judicating due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps the classic
example of this process is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mapp v. Ohio,24 which holds that the
Due Process Clause requires states to apply the
exclusionary rule to unconstitutionally seized
evidence. A significant basis for this ruling was
the emergence of a consensus among state
courts that exclusion was the only workable
remedy for police violations of constitutional
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The emergence of this consensus, the
Court held, was sufficient to allow it to deter-
mine that the exclusion of unconstitutionally
seized evidence was, contrary to a prior deci-
sion, which it overruled, an aspect of the or-
dered liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause.25
Since Mapp, the Court has turned increas-
ingly to state constitutional law to provide a
baseline against which to measure whether any
particular individual right can be considered
part of the fundamental liberty protected by the
federal Constitution.26 Most recently, and dra-
matically, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas27 re-
versed its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick28 and
invalidated on due process grounds a state law
criminalizing homosexual conduct. In reaching
this decision, the Court relied in part on an ex-
amination of state practice and policy following
its ruling in Bowers, during the course of which
it noted that no fewer than five state appellate
courts had explicitly rejected Bowers as a guide
for construing due process and privacy provi-
sions of their state constitutions.29
This process of intersystemic judicial dia-
logue and influence need not take a long time
to bear fruit, at least as judged by the deliber-
ate standards of constitutional jurisprudence.
The time elapsed between the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wolf v. Colorado,30 in which the
Court held that the exclusion of unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence was not part of the or-
dered liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause, and its decision in Mapp holding the
opposite, was just twelve years. The Court de-
cided Bowers in 1986, but reversed itself in
Lawrence just seventeen years later. The state
constitutional decisions rejecting Bowers upon
which the Court relied were decided in only a
ten-year span, from 1992 to 2002. Considering
that the Court tends to measure the constitu-
tional protections of due process in terms of tra-
dition and history, this is rapid progress in-
deed.
These considerations suggest that a state con-
stitutional litigation strategy may feasibly re-
vive the prospects for the kind of challenge to
partisan gerrymandering that has never suc-
ceeded in federal court and for which the
Court’s decision in Vieth offered little hope. A
closer examination of state constitutions sug-





One of the great disadvantages of litigating
electoral and political issues under the federal
Constitution is that the Constitution has com-
paratively little to say about the electoral pro-
cess. For example, it confers no affirmative
right to vote for any office; does not regulate in
any significant way the course of democratic
politics; and does not rest upon any clearly ar-
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24367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25Id. at 657–58.
26See Gardner, supra note 23, at 1040–43.
27539 U.S. 558 (2003).
28478 U.S. 186 (1986).
29539 U.S. at 576.
30338 U.S. 25 (1949).
31I take it as a given, for purposes of this analysis, that ju-
dicial intervention to curb partisan gerrymandering could
be a good thing. There is, of course, a respectable view to
the contrary, not only on the Court, but in the legal acad-
emy as well. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein and Jonathan
Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the
Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1
(1985); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan
Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 1325 (1987); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense
of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Ac-
quiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 649 (2002).
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ticulated conception of political life, other than
perhaps an eighteenth-century republican con-
ception that the nation has long outgrown.32
State constitutions typically do not share these
drawbacks. Most contain numerous provisions
affirmatively ordering and protecting the elec-
toral process; many contain provisions specifi-
cally regulating apportionment; and many re-
flect overtly contemporary conceptions of
politics informed by movements ranging from
early twentieth-century Progressivism to more
recent models of egalitarian political participa-
tion and influence. These features make state
constitutions potentially rich veins to be mined
by opponents of partisan gerrymandering.33
As the Supreme Court has said on many oc-
casions, the U.S. Constitution “does not confer
the right the right of suffrage upon any one.”34
Instead, the Constitution protects only a deriv-
ative right of equal treatment in voting that is
parasitic on state constitutional standards.35 In-
deed, because the Constitution specifically al-
locates the establishment of voting rights in
federal elections to the states,36 state constitu-
tions establish the right to vote not only in state
and local elections, but in federal elections as
well. Typically, state constitutions provide the
right to vote to any person who meets the con-
stitutional requirements of eligibility, which
most often include citizenship, age, and resi-
dency.37
Moreover, again unlike the U.S. Constitu-
tion, most state constitutions provide some
form of affirmative protection for the right to
vote. For example, the constitutions of eight
states require elections to be “free,” thirteen
state constitutions require elections to be “free
and equal,” and five require elections to be
“free and open.”38 The constitutions of Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina
provide specifically that all qualified voters
have an equal right to vote or to elect officers.39
The West Virginia Constitution provides that
every citizen is entitled to equal representation
in government.40 The constitutions of numer-
ous states require the state legislature to enact
laws to secure the “purity” or “integrity” of
elections, to “guard against abuses,” to provide
for “free” elections, or to prevent “corrup-
tion.”41
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32See James A. Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-In-
terest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86 Iowa L.
Rev. 87, 126–30 (2000).
33In suggesting that partisan gerrymandering litigators
turn to state constitutions, I mean to argue only for a par-
ticular litigation strategy, not for any particular standard
of judicial review. I make no claim here to any insight
into which standard might prove most appealing to state
judges. Courts and commentators have proposed nu-
merous ways in which to adjudicate the constitutional-
ity of partisan gerrymandering claims, and unless it re-
ally is the case that no partisan gerrymandering standard
could ever be judicially manageable, I assume that at least
some of the standards that have been previously pro-
posed will have sufficient appeal to stand a chance of
adoption by state courts. For a sampling of such stan-
dards, see, in addition to the various opinions in Vieth
and Bandemer, Bernard Grofman’s useful overview in An
Expert Witness Perspective on Continuing and Emerg-
ing Voting Rights Controversies: From One Person, One
Vote to Partisan Gerrymandering, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 783
(1992). According to Grofman, most of the standards that
have been proposed rely on some variant of either visual
irregularity, deviations from proportionality, bias in seat-
vote ratios, discriminatory treatment of incumbents of
the minority party, or the totality of the circumstances.
In addition, some commentators have proposed proce-
dural solutions, such as reliance on nonpartisan district-
ing commissions, Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering
and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (2002), or re-
quiring bipartisan compromise in the creation of plans,
Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 Fla.
L. Rev. 403 (1993).
34Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874).
35Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
36U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
37See, e.g., Maine Const. art. II, § 1; N.D. Const. art. II, §
1; Va. Const. art. II, § 1.
38 “Free”: Cal. Const. art. IV, § 1.5; Mass. Const. Part the
First, art. IX; Neb. Const. art. 1, § 22; N.H. Const. Part the
First, art. 11; N.C. Const. art. I, § 10; Utah Const. art. I, §
17; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 8; Va. Const. art. I, § 6. “Free and
equal”: Ariz. Const. art. II, § 21; Ark. Const. art. 3, § 2; Del
Const. art. I, § 3; Ill. Const. art. III, § 3; Ind. Const. art. 2,
§ 1; Ky. Const. § 6; Okla. Const. art. III, § 5; Or. Const. art.
II, § 1; Pa. Const. art. I, § 5; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 19; Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 5; Wash. Const. art. I, § 19; Wy. Const. art.
1, § 27. “Free and open”: Col. Const. art. II, § 5; Mo. Const.
art. I, § 25, art. VI, § 18(e) (county elections); Mont. Const.
art. II, § 13; N.M. Const. art. II, § 8; S.C. Const. art. I, § 5.
39Mass. Const. Part the First, art. IX; N.H. Const. Part the
First, art. 11; S.C. Const. art. I, § 5.
40W.Va. Const. art. II, § 2–4.
41Secure purity or integrity of elections and/or guard
against abuses: Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 12; Colo. Const. art.
VII, § 11; Del Const. art. V, § 1; Ill. Const. art. III, § 4; Md.
Const. art. I, § 1.7; Mich. Const. art. II, § 4; Mont. Const.
art. IV, § 3; Nev. Const. art. 2, § 6; N.M. Const. art. VII, §
1; S.D. Const. art. VII, § 2; Tenn. Const. art. IV, § 1; Tex.
Const. art. 6, § 4; Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 13. Provide for free
elections or suffrage: Cal. Const. art. II, § 3, art. VII, § 8;
Conn. Const. art. VI, § 4; Del. Const. art. V, § 1; Ky. Const.
§ 150; Or. Const. art. II, § 8. Prevent corruption: Del. Const.
art. V, § 1; W.Va. Const. art. IV, § 4–11.
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In the case of gerrymandering, most state
constitutions supplement these general princi-
ples of fair elections with specific provisions
regulating the apportionment process, includ-
ing the way in which election district bound-
aries must be drawn. For example, many such
provisions require district lines to respect the
integrity of local government boundaries.42
The great majority of state constitutions con-
tain specific requirements that election districts
be “contiguous” and “compact.”43 Six state
constitutions require districts to be “conve-
nient.”44 The Colorado Constitution is even
more specific, requiring that “the aggregate
linear distance of all district boundaries shall
be as short as possible.”45 Michigan addition-
ally requires certain districts to be “as rectan-
gular” and “as nearly uniform in shape as pos-
sible.”46
Perhaps the most rigorous state constitu-
tional regulation of the apportionment process
requires that election districts be coherent po-
litical communities. The Alaska Constitution
provides that legislative districts should con-
tain “as nearly as practicable a relatively inte-
grated socio-economic area.”47 The Hawaii
Constitution similarly provides: “submergence
of an area in a larger district wherein substan-
tially different socio-economic interests pre-
dominate shall be avoided.”48 More compre-
hensively, the Colorado Constitution provides:
“communities of interest, including ethnic, cul-
tural, economic, trade area, geographic, and de-
mographic factors, shall be preserved within a
single district wherever possible.”49 Delaware,
Hawaii, and Washington try to achieve fairness
in redistricting even more directly by requiring
that districts not unduly favor or discriminate
against any person, group, or political party.50
Finally, even where state constitutions lack
specific provisions regulating the electoral pro-
cess, or where the relevant provisions are
vague, additional guidance concerning the con-
stitutional structure of the electoral system may
sometimes be found in political theories that
have influenced the evolution of American
state constitutions. For purposes of partisan
gerrymandering, one of the most important of
these theories is Progressivism, which left a
deep imprint on many state constitutions dur-
ing the early twentieth century.51 One of Pro-
gressivism’s fundamental principles was a
deep skepticism of incumbency, born in the be-
lief that government at the turn of the twenti-
eth century was in the grasp of a corrupt eco-
nomic elite that used governmental power both
to enrich itself and to entrench its own hold
over the levers of power.52 Progressives ac-
cordingly sought to reform state and local gov-
ernment by creating institutions of direct
democracy, such as the initiative, referendum,
and recall election, which would allow ordi-
nary voters to thwart plans by incumbent
power-holders to serve their own interests and
to assure their own continuation in office.53 In
those states in which Progressives succeeded in
institutionalizing reform at the constitutional
level, state constitutions may thus quite plau-
sibly be understood to embody a strong pref-
erence for electoral responsiveness to the pop-
ular will, and a corresponding suspicion of
official manipulation of the rules of electoral
engagement. More recently, some state consti-
tutions have been amended to enact term lim-
its and campaign finance reform,54 measures
that further reflect popular suspicion of in-
cumbents as well as a popular preference for
fair, egalitarian, and competitive electoral con-
tests among candidates for political office.
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42E.g., Neb. Const. art. 3, § 5, art. VII, § 10; Pa. Const. art.
II, § 16; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 18.
43E.g., Alaska Const. art. VI, § 6; Colo. Const. art. V, § 47;
N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4.
44(1) Mich. Const. art. IV, §§ 2, 3; (2) Minn. Const. art. IV,
§ 3; (3) Mo. Const. art. III, § 5; (4) N.Y. Const. art. III, § 5;
(5) Wash. Const. art. II, §§ 6, 43(5); (6) Wis. Const. art. IV,
§ 5.
45Colo. Const. art. V, § 47(1).
46Mich. Const. art. IV, § 2.
47Alaska Const. art. VI, § 6.
48Hawaii Const. art. IV, § 6(8).
49Colo. Const. art. V, § 47(3).
50Del. Const. art. II, § 2A; Haw. Const. art. IV, § 6; Wash.
Const. art. II, § 43(5).
51Tarr, supra note 15, at 150–53.
52See, e.g., Benjamin Parke DeWitt, The Progressive
Movement (New York: Macmillan, 1915); Richard Hofs-
tadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New
York: Knopf, 1955); Joseph P. Harris, California Politics
(4th edition) (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.,
1967).
53De Witt, supra note 52.
54Term limits: E.g., Cal. Const. art. 4, § 1.5; Mich. Const.
art. IV, § 54; Ohio Const. art. 2, § 2, art. 3, § 2. Campaign
finance: E.g., Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 16; Colo. Const. art.
XVIII; Nev. Const. art. 2, § 10; Okla. Const. art. IX, § 40;
Or. Const. art. II, § 22; R.I. Const. art. IV, § 10.
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These provisions and background political
theories could obviously be of great value in any
challenge to partisan gerrymandering under a
state constitution. The existence of an affirma-
tive, constitutionally guaranteed right to vote
could serve as an anchor for advancing a chal-
lenge to partisan gerrymandering on the ground
that it is fundamentally antidemocratic. State
constitutional requirements that elections be
“free” or “fair” or “equal” might provide pur-
chase in challenging partisan gerrymandering
as a form of incumbent self-protection. Provi-
sions governing the shape and composition of
electoral districts might be invoked to challenge
specific districts as well as entire redistricting
plans. And all of these approaches could be re-
inforced by reference to constitutional back-
ground principles disfavoring electoral unre-
sponsiveness and incumbency protection.
It bears repeating here that state constitutional
law is independent of federal constitutional law,
and state courts are thus in no way constrained
by the various approaches to partisan gerry-
mandering articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court justices who wrote opinions in Bandemer
and Vieth. State courts considering claims of par-
tisan gerrymandering might of course find use-
ful guidance in federal case law, and if they
thought some particular opinion to be especially
valuable might conceivably adopt its analysis
for purposes of state constitutional law; this has
certainly been the dominant pattern in other ar-
eas.55 But state judges might just as easily strike
off on their own, crafting a standard based on
an independent analysis of the problem or tai-
loring it to whatever specific requirements the
state constitution might uniquely impose.
In fairness, it must be noted that state courts
have not thus far taken a particularly active role
in using state constitutions to police state po-
litical processes in general, or partisan gerry-
mandering in particular.56 Many of the provi-
sions mentioned above are, by federal stand-
ards, surprisingly underinterpreted and under-
enforced.57 On the other hand, most provisions
of state constitutions, except perhaps those
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55See, e.g., Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the
State Court “Revolution,” 74 Judicature 190 (1991); James
N. G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State Constitu-
tions: A Quantitative Appraisal, 63 Albany Law Review
1183 (2000).
56Although many state appellate courts have heard chal-
lenges to redistricting plans based on claims of partisan
gerrymandering, no state court has as yet attempted to
develop an independent state constitutional standard for
analyzing such claims. The closest approach to such a
standard has been made by the Alaska Supreme Court.
In a series of cases, that court has ruled that the Alaska
Constitution’s equal protection provision sets a more de-
manding standard than the Fourteenth Amendment in
that it not only creates a group-based right to represen-
tation, but also requires something resembling propor-
tionality of representation in districting. However, al-
though the court has applied this principle to invalidate
redistricting plans for diluting the representation of vot-
ers identified geographically, it has never applied this anal-
ysis to groups of voters identified in terms of partisan loy-
alty. See Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 846 P.2d 38
(Alaska 1992); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d
1352 (Alaska 1987). At the other end of the spectrum, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution’s equal protection provision means ex-
actly the same thing as the Fourteenth Amendment, and
has expressly adopted the Bandemer approach to partisan
gerrymandering claims brought under the state constitu-
tion. Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331–32 (Pa.
2002).
In another group of cases, state courts have recognized
that partisan gerrymandering claims may be raised un-
der the state constitution, but have chosen to analyze such
claims solely under specific state constitutional provisions
expressly requiring compactness, contiguity, or socio-eco-
nomic coherence in the drawing of legislative district
lines. See, e.g., In re Colorado General Assembly, 828 P.2d
185 (Colo. 1992); In re Legislative Districting, 805 A.2d
292, 320 (Md. 2002). These cases probably should not be
read to hold that claims of partisan gerrymandering are
exhausted by analysis of district compactness and conti-
guity; more likely, litigants charging partisan gerryman-
dering simply chose to couch their claims so as to raise
issues only under explicitly articulated state constitu-
tional requirements.
Finally, there is a large class of state constitutional cases
in which, all too typically, state courts relying on Bande-
mer to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims have been
ambiguous about whether their analyses apply solely to
claims under the federal Constitution or also to parallel
claims brought under the state constitution. See, e.g.,
Jensen v. Kentucky State Board of Elections, 959 S.W.2d
771 (Ky. 1997); Kendall v. Douglas, Grant, Lincoln &
Okanogan Counties Public Hospital District No. 6, 820
P.2d 497 (Wash. 1991). On the unhelpful tendency of state
courts to be ambiguous about whether they are analyz-
ing issues under the state or federal constitutions, or both,
see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Con-
stitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 785–88 (1992).
57See, e.g., Matthew C. Jones, Fraud and the Franchise:
The Pennsylvania Constitution’s “Free and Equal Elec-
tion” Clause as an Independent Basis for State and Local
Election Challenges, 68 Temple L. Rev. 1473 (1995);
Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive
Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluat-
ing Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92
Mich. L. Rev. 483, 528 (1993).
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dealing with criminal procedure, which forms
a large part of the state constitutional caseload,
tend to be sparsely interpreted, so the absence
of an extensive body of case law on which to
base a partisan gerrymandering claim need not
indicate a judicial reluctance to engage state
constitutional electoral provisions. If anything,
a trend may well be emerging in which state
courts are increasingly adjudicating challenges
under provisions of state constitutions regulat-
ing apportionment. In the most recent redis-
tricting cycle, for example, courts in Colorado,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia—
none of which has a supreme court with a
strong record of active reliance on its state con-
stitution—all issued opinions providing new
and important guidance concerning the mean-
ing of state constitutional provisions regulating
the redistricting process.58
Vieth itself, moreover, may make state courts
more willing to turn to their state constitutions
to settle questions arising out of the appor-
tionment process. Although state courts have
sometimes been reflexively—many would say
excessively—deferential to federal decisional
law when construing state constitutions,59
much of this deference may be attributable to
a feeling among state judges that the federal ju-
diciary typically does a more or less adequate
job of protecting individual rights and that
there is thus no pressing need for state inter-
vention under state constitutions.60 In contrast,
state courts have been a good deal more will-
ing to act when they see themselves as the last
line of defense in areas where the federal courts
are falling down on the job.61 Vieth’s vivid
demonstration of the Supreme Court’s contin-
ued paralysis might well serve as convincing
evidence to state courts that they are the only
institution left capable of restraining excessive
partisan gerrymandering, and this knowledge
might well prompt them to enter the fray.
One possible impediment to aggressive state
judicial intervention in gerrymandering cases
is that state judges, who are frequently elected,
may be more dependent on maintaining the fa-
vor of political parties and legislative party
leaders than federal judges. There is some sys-
tematic evidence that elected judges are less
likely than appointed judges to take contro-
versial positions,62 and certainly ample anec-
dotal evidence, such as California’s infamous
1986 judicial retention election unseating three
state supreme court justices, of popular back-
lashes against elected judges that have the po-
tential to inhibit judicial independence. Yet
most of this evidence is relevant only to situa-
tions in which state judges might be hesitant to
construe the state constitution to reach demo-
cratically unpopular results. However unpop-
ular state judicial restraint of partisan gerry-
mandering might be with party and legislative
leaders, there is very little likelihood that it will
prove unpopular with voters. State polities
have long been highly suspicious of state leg-
islatures, a sentiment made all too clear by the
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58Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003) (con-
struing provisions of state constitution governing fre-
quency of redistrictings); Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So. 2d
429 (Miss. 2003) (construing jurisdiction of lower courts
to supervise congressional redistricting); Stephenson v.
Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247 (N.C. 2003) (interpreting provision
of state constitution prohibiting division of counties in re-
districting); West v. Gilmore, 2002 Va. Cir. LEXIS 37 (Va.
Cir. Ct., March 10, 2002) (construing state constitutional
requirements that election districts be contiguous and bar-
ring racial discrimination in redistricting).
59E.g., Brennan, supra note 17, at 502; Robert F. Williams,
In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Re-
jection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 South
Carolina Law Review 353, 356 (1984).
60Gardner, supra note 23, at 1061. See also Stewart G. Pol-
lack, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Funda-
mental Rights, 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 707 (1983).
61This was of course the essence of Justice Brennan’s fa-
mous appeal to state courts to “step into the breach.”
Brennan, supra note 17, at 503. Some evidence of this ap-
proach might be found, for example, in state courts’ fre-
quent rejection of Rehnquist Court decisions cutting back
on the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. Com-
pare, for instance, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), re-
laxing the requirements for obtaining a warrant on the
testimony of an anonymous informant, with its frequent
rejection by state courts under state constitutions: State v.
Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985); People v. Campa, 686
P.2d 634 (Cal. 1984); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d
548 (Mass. 1985); State v. Cordova, 784 P.2d 30 (N.M.
1989); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988);
State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989); State v.
Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984).
62Paul Brace, Melinda Gann Hall, and Laura Langer, Ju-
dicial Choice and the Politics of Abortion: Institutions,
Context, and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 Albany Law Re-
view 1265 (1999); Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics
and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 Journal
of Politics 427 (1992).
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extensive state constitutional record of cumu-
lative restrictions on state legislative power.63
More to the point, voters in many states, par-
ticularly those with initiative and referendum
procedures, have been trying for some time
now to reform a political process with which
they are clearly disgusted, efforts that have of-
ten been thwarted by federal courts.64 State ju-
dicial restraint of excessively partisan gerry-
mandering, and the frequently uncompetitive
and unrepresentative districts it creates, would
very likely please voters, reducing any inhibi-
tions elected judges might otherwise feel.
CONCLUSION
Given the Supreme Court’s equivocal ruling
in Vieth, a litigation strategy challenging parti-
san gerrymandering in state courts under state
constitutions might be the most promising way
to elicit meaningful judicial intervention. State
constitutions offer significant opportunities for
successful challenges to partisan gerrymander-
ing, and well-established patterns in the de-
velopment of state constitutional jurisprudence
suggest that many state courts might be open
to resolving such claims. Of course, sustained
success in state courts might in the long run
render any federal constitutional law of parti-
san gerrymandering largely irrelevant. Even
so, state constitutional rulings might also in-
fluence the content of federal constitutional
standards by providing a state-level consensus
baseline suitable for adoption by federal courts
in partisan gerrymandering cases arising under
the U.S. Constitution. Through such a process,
state constitutional standards, shaped by state-
level election reform litigation, may be reintro-
duced into federal constitutional law in the
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63Tarr, supra note 15, at 117–26.
64Some of these measures include term limits, blanket pri-
maries, and campaign finance reform. Many of these in-
novations have been invalidated by federal courts. See,
e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (in-
validating state-imposed term limits on members of Con-
gress); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
(2000) (invalidating a blanket primary where it was op-
posed by a major political party); Vanatta v. Keisling, 899
F. Supp. 488 (D. Or. 1995), aff’d, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999) (invalidating Ore-
gon provision prohibiting candidates for state office to ex-
pend funds donated by nonresidents).
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